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Abstract 
Applying price indexes presents a challenge in estimating the costs of new defense systems. 
An inappropriate price index can introduce errors in both development of cost estimating 
relationships (CERs) and in development of out-year budgets. In this paper we apply two sets 
of price indexes to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter procurement program, both to help cost 
analysts understand the impacts of different price indexes and to provide guidance in their 
choice. 
We approach this problem via hedonic price indexes derived from CERs. These indexes 
isolate changes in price due to factors other than changes in quality over time. We develop a 
“Baseline” CER model using data on historical tactical aircraft programs available at the F 
35’s late-2001 Milestone B decision. Comparisons are made between the Baseline model 
estimates, F-35 program office estimates, and estimates using cost models employing more 
conventional approaches to inflation adjustment. We find that the Baseline hedonic model 
provides estimates close to actual F-35 costs. As the hedonic index is directly estimated only 
for the historic period, we develop a procedure to project inflation rates based on historical 
hedonic index values. 
Introduction 
Background 
The application of price indexes presents a substantial challenge in estimating the 
costs of new defense systems. The problem is twofold. First, the analyst must use a price 
index when normalizing historical cost data to a common point in time (where the normalized 
costs are referred to as “base year” [BY] dollars in defense acquisitions or, more generally, 
“real” dollars), so that these data can be used to help estimate the costs of future systems. 
Second, as budget requirements for future acquisitions are in “then-year” (TY) dollars (or 
more generally, “nominal” dollars), BY dollar estimates must be escalated to TY dollars 
using a price index. Using an inappropriate price index can introduce errors in both of these 
steps. In this paper, we apply two sets of price indexes to a cost estimating problem—the F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) procurement program. The purpose is to help cost analysts and 
others involved in the acquisition process understand the impacts of different price indexes 
and to provide guidance in their choice. 
In general, price indexes isolate changes in price due to factors other than quality 
changes. These changes can be categorized into changes due to general inflation, changes 
in the overall price level in the economy (subsequently often just called “inflation”), and real 
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price growth—price changes for a particular class of products relative to inflation. The 
combination of inflation and real price growth constitute price escalation—overall change in 
the price of a specified, constant quality, good, or service. 
The point of departure for this work is the analysis of escalation indexes presented in 
Harmon, Levine, and Horowitz (2014; hereafter “D-5112”). The overall goal of that research 
was to identify a price index that is better than current indexes at meeting the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) need for a sound basis for cost estimation. In particular, we explored an 
alternative “hedonic” approach for calculating price indexes for tactical aircraft. In this 
analysis, we used updates to the hedonic model presented in D-5112 in the F-35 example. 
The F-35 Cost Estimating Problem  
The F-35 program has experienced significant program cost growth since its October 
2001 Milestone (MS) B decision that initiated Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
(EMD). A substantial portion of this cost growth has been in its unit recurring flyaway (URF) 
cost, with much of this attributed to the incorrect application of price indexes (Arnold et al., 
2010). Given the tactical aircraft focus of the Institute for Defense Analyses’ (IDA) previous 
hedonic models, the F-35 makes for a suitable case study. 
We used information available at MS B to develop models for exploring the effects of 
escalation adjustments on estimated F-35 URF costs. The resulting estimated costs can 
then be compared to several benchmarks, including cost estimates produced by the JSF 
program office (JPO) and observed URF costs for F-35s procured from 2007 to 2013. From 
this exercise, we draw lessons for future cost estimating practice. 
Hedonic Price Index Models for Tactical Aircraft 
Introduction 
In this chapter, we review past work on hedonic price index models and present 
updates developed specifically for the F-35 cost estimation problem. The estimation of the 
hedonic indexes for tactical aircraft builds upon tools that cost estimators have used for 
years. The basic setup is 
nominal system unit price = f(year, quality variables, other control variables) 
The hedonic index application has commonalities with cost estimating relationships 
(CERs), which also model system costs as a function of quality variables, and cost/quantity 
relationships (primarily learning), which are control variables in the hedonic model. The 
hedonic index estimation differs from past cost estimating practice in that the price index is 
estimated simultaneously with other model parameters and the dependent variable is 
expressed in TY (nominal) dollars. In CER development, adjustments needed to normalize 
historical cost data to BY dollars used as the dependent variable are often performed using 
a general deflator based on an index of overall inflation, such as that published in the 
National Defense Budget Estimates “Green Book” by the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller; OUSD[C]).1 For commodities such as tactical aircraft, a given 
observed price may reflect both inflation and relative price changes, including those due to 
                                            
 
 
1 The National Defense Budget Estimates is commonly referred to as “the Green Book.” It is a 
reference source for data associated within current DoD budget estimates. 
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variation in the quantity purchased. Typically normalization to a common quantity (e.g., first 
unit or 100th unit)2 is performed using BY dollars prior to CER estimation. Thus, another 
unique aspect of our modeling is the simultaneous estimation of CER and learning curve 
parameters, as well as production rate effects. 
The hedonic analysis described in D-5112 used the direct time-dummy variable 
approach formulated by Triplett, an early developer of hedonic analysis (Triplett, 2006). The 
update to the earlier analyses also used this approach, along with the same set of 
explanatory variables (presented in Table 1). Five quality variables describe the aircraft, two 
quantity variables capture the cost effects of learning and production rate, and the time-
dummy variables identify each fiscal year in which the aircraft were procured. The hedonic 
index is defined by the expression ,where   is a 1/0 dummy variable with a value of 1 
for fiscal year t, and  is the estimated index for that year. BY dollars are calculated as 
	
	
. In the application of the Green Book index, the index (where the 
base year value equals 1) replaces the  expression in calculating BY dollars.3 
 Explanatory Variables 
 
The database used in regression estimation contains pooled cross-section and time-
series data, often called “panel data” in the econometrics literature, where each panel is an 
aircraft program. The cost metric of interest is the unit recurring flyaway cost (URF). In D-
5112, the time series included 40 fiscal years (FYs 1973–2013), with 2012 as the base year; 
the cross-sections (panels) consisted of the 11 aircraft programs’ original designs plus 
derivatives of these designs from series or block changes. In model estimation, the quality 
changes associated with the series/block changes are captured in the changes in empty 
weight over time. Production rate effects were calculated by estimating the annual fixed cost 
                                            
 
 
2 Although unit prices are also sensitive to production rate, this typically has not been taken into 
account. 
3 If the values for the Green Book escalation index were the same as the hedonic price index, all 
other model parameters would also be the same. 
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for each program.4 Learning spillovers due to commonality between the EA 18G and F/A 
18E/F and between the F-35 variants were included in the model.5 We also accounted for 
loss of learning due to series/block changes.6 
Updating Hedonic Price Index Models for Tactical Aircraft 
For the current analyses, we made multiple changes to the previous work, including 
several versions of the model meant to capture different aspects of the F-35 cost estimating 
problem. Our primary focus is on the “Baseline” F-35 model; the intent was to use the 
vintage of information available for the MS B (October 2001) cost estimate. As the FY 2002 
budget materials were released earlier in 2001, we used data through FY 2002. Eliminating 
the newer data means that we dropped the EA-18G from the data sample along with the 
three F-35 variants (F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C); also, the F-22A program is truncated. This 
left the F-22A as the sole fifth-generation aircraft with only two data points (2001 and 2002). 
In order to include another fifth-generation aircraft, we added the F-117A7 to the updated 
sample.  
In addition to the original series aircraft, derivative follow-on aircraft were relevant for 
the F-14A (F-14A+ and F-14B), F-15A (F-15C, F-15C MSIP, and F-15E), F-16A (F 16C 
Blocks 25/30/50), F/A-18A (F/A-18C and F/A-18C Night Attack), and A/V-8B (A/V-8B Night 
Attack and A/V-8B Radar).8 As these derivative aircraft were produced serially, they were 
included in the same panel as the original design. We use 2002 as the BY price index; this 
was also the BY for the F-35 MS B estimates and the associated URF goal.  
In addition to the Baseline model, we estimated other model variations to address 
different aspects of the F-35 cost estimating problem. The Green Book model replaces the 
statistically estimated hedonic index with the procurement budget index published in the FY 
2002 National Defense Budget Estimates. This would be more typical of the approach used 
in CER estimation. All hedonic model variations follow the “Full CER Hedonic Model” 
approach from D-5112. We also estimated a “Full Information” model, using complete actual 
data through 2013. The purpose of that model is to provide a close comparison with the 
model included in D-5112.9 A slight modification of this model excludes the F-35—the “Full 
Information less F-35” variation provides hedonic index values through 2013 without using 
any information from F-35 program cost experience. Unlike in the D-5112 and Full 
Information models, the Baseline model does not generate price index values from 2003 to 
                                            
 
 
4 Fixed costs for each program were estimated as a function of the estimated maximum variable 
costs. 
5 Learning spillovers are captured by estimating parameters that assign some portion of the 
cumulative quantity across related aircraft.  
6 This is accounted for by parameters that decrement cumulative quantity at each block change. 
7 Stealth technology is the prime feature of fifth-generation aircraft and the F-117. The F-117 differs 
from newer examples of fifth-generation aircraft in having less sophisticated electronic systems. 
8 Military aircraft are described by Mission-Design-Series (MDS). For the F-14A, for example, the 
mission is fighter (F), the design is 14, and the original series is A. The aircraft in column headings of 
Table 1 are new designs, with the exception of the F/A-18E, which was a major change from the 
previous F/A-18s. The three F-35 variants are being built for different missions and produced in 
parallel. 
9 The model in D-5112 only used data through 2012 and did not include the F-117A. 
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2013; instead, a methodology is presented in which model results are extrapolated to 
produce estimated index values through 2013.  
Model Estimation and Results 
This section presents regression results for the different model variations. 
Comparisons are shown between these models and the Full CER Hedonic Model described 
in D-5112. As the functional form of the models is the same, we do not repeat the detailed 
exposition presented in D-5112—instead, we highlight the differences in the regression 
results. 
We estimate the model parameters using maximum likelihood estimation. The 
models are fit using the nonlinear optimization package within Microsoft Excel. The 
distribution of errors is assumed to be multiplicative/lognormal—this is analogous to 
estimating a log-log regression using linear regression. 
Table 2 presents key regression metrics and parameter estimates for the five 
models. 
 Comparison of Regression Results 
 
The regression fits for the models in which a hedonic index is estimated are 
comparable. Restricting the index to that prescribed in the 2002 Green Book results in a 
significantly worse model fit. The learning curve slopes are similar for the hedonic models, 
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but the slope is substantially shallower for the Green Book model (88% vs. 84%)—again, 
this is consistent with the embedded underestimation of escalation when normalizing the 
data to constant year dollars. Systematically lower constant dollar costs in the earlier years 
mean that the estimated learning effect is blunted. The steeper learning slope is also 
consistent with values of fighter/attack aircraft learning curve coefficients estimated using 
labor hour costs in previous studies (Resetar, Rogers, & Hess, 1991; Younossi, Kennedy, & 
Graser, 2001; Harmon, 2010).  
Coefficients on weight, speed, and materials composition are relatively stable across 
the models and are consistent with those reported in past CER studies (Resetar et al., 1991; 
Younossi et al., 2001; Harmon, 2010; Harmon, Nelson, & Arnold, 1991). Unit prices increase 
with weight, maximum speed, and more advanced materials. The one exception is the 
speed variable in the Green Book model—as the aircraft with the highest maximum speeds 
(the F-15 and F-14) appear early in the sample, the underestimates of aircraft inflation 
associated with the model tend to bias its parameter estimate downward. Estimates for the 
fifth-generation and STOVL aircraft effects change some when the F 117 is introduced into 
the sample. The fifth-generation factor increases from 1.11 to 1.16, while the STOVL factor 
decreases from 1.10 to 1.05. When the F-35 is excluded from the regression, the STOVL 
factor goes to 1.00—this reflects the influence of the F 35B (which is a fifth-generation 
STOVL aircraft), with the A/V-8B the only other STOVL aircraft in the sample.10 The range of 
fifth-generation premiums for the hedonic models is generally consistent with values from an 
earlier IDA paper on the cost of stealth (Nelson et al., 2001), although the 1.24 factor for the 
Baseline model is somewhat higher than expected. The 1.44 factor estimated with the 
Green Book model is clearly too high—the bias is a mirror image of the maximum speed 
coefficient, where underestimated escalation and newer fifth-generation aircraft interact. 
Thus, if there is a relationship between time and the values of the quality variables, a 
systematic bias in the price escalation used will result in a related bias in the coefficients on 
the quality variables. Also note that the analogous cost drivers in the historical studies are 
usually estimated using labor hour data, eliminating the possibility of bias from price 
escalation.  
Estimated first unit variable costs (T1s) for each initial Mission-Design-Series (MDS) 
(usually the “A” series) are calculated using the quality coefficients, the regression intercept, 
and the values of the quality variables for each MDS. Table 2 (on page 5) shows the T1s for 
all relevant MDS, including “out-of-sample” cases in which the MDS was not used in model 
estimation. These cases are the F-35 variants, with the exception of the F-117A, which was 
not used in estimating the D-5112 model. For the models using the hedonic indexes, the 
out-of-sample estimates were close to the values calculated using the models that included 
those MDS. The exception is the F-35B, where the more complex STOVL capabilities were 
not well captured in the models not using the F-35 data. Even in this case, the out-of-sample 
F-35B T1s are only around 5% lower than the estimates from the other hedonic models. The 
T1s from the Green Book models are all substantially lower than those from the hedonic 
models. This is consistent with the shallower learning curve for the Green Book model, 
where the real prices of the initial lots are systematically underestimated because of biased 
                                            
 
 
10 This does not mean that STOVL capabilities are free in the model; holding all else equal, STOVL 
aircraft will tend to be heavier and have more advanced materials than a conventional aircraft. Also 
note that in model estimation, the coefficient on the STOVL dummy was restricted to ≥ 1.00. 
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escalation. Figure 1 shows the escalation indexes for a selection of the regression models.11 
Also included for comparison is the latest (FY 2015) Green Book index. 
 
 Comparison of Price Indexes 
These indexes are portrayed in the price growth rates shown in Table 2. Of most 
interest for the F-35 estimating exercise are the Baseline and Green Book models. The 
other models are included for comparison purposes as well as to provide escalation 
estimates through 2013. There is no 2002–2013 escalation associated with the Baseline 
model; one of the goals of our analyses is to suggest a methodology for extrapolating 
forward growth rates from the Baseline model hedonic index. Also note how little the Green 
Book inflation changed from the FY 2002 forecasts (including extrapolations from FY 2007 
to FY 2013) through the actuals reflected in the latest FY 2015 values.  
Normalizing the data using the Green Book index results in a constant-dollar cost 
data set and associated model that systematically underestimates costs in the earlier years 
and overestimates costs in the later years. In addition to introducing bias in the quality 
parameters, using the Green Book index also results in a shallower learning curve. This 
behavior is not evident in the Baseline model. It is clear in both the distortion of the 
parameter estimates and the systematic errors in estimating the actual data that a naïve 
application of price indexes can be problematic.  
 
 
                                            
 
 
11 The published FY 2002 Green Book deflators only include projections through FY 2007. Beyond FY 
2007, we use the 2.1% inflation rate evident in the FY 2004 to FY 2007 projections. 
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F-35 Cost Estimating Applications 
Introduction 
We compare F-35 URF estimates generated by the Baseline and Green Book 
models against three sets of benchmarks. They include 
 MS B program cost estimates and subsequent cost estimates associated with 
the 2009 “Nunn-McCurdy” unit cost breach,12 in BY 2002 dollars; 
 Actual TY dollar budget values for the 2008–2013 fiscal year lots; and 
 The latest program cost estimate as reported in the December 2013 selected 
acquisition report (SAR), reported in TY dollars. 
To do this, we use the Baseline and Green Book models to produce BY 2002 cost 
estimates for each scenario. For comparisons with the TY actuals and estimates we use 
either an index calculated from the historical hedonic index (“projected hedonic index”) or 
the Green Book index. The BY 2002 estimate comparisons demonstrate the effect of 
different price indexes on the structure of the CER model, while the TY dollar estimates also 
show the effect of the different indexes in projecting BY estimates forward. 
F-35 MS B and Nunn-McCurdy Breach Estimates 
MS B estimates are the initial benchmarks used for budgeting and for calculating 
program cost growth. As both models take into account production rate and learning, they 
can produce an analog of the MS B estimate using the quantities and production schedule 
associated with the October 2001 program. The IDA model estimates in this application do 
not carry explicit assumptions regarding future (post-2002) escalation—they are in BY 2002 
dollars as directly calculated by the model. Figure 2 shows comparisons between the MS B 
URF estimates (all F-35 variants combined) and those generated by the Baseline and Green 
Book models using MS B input values.  
The estimates from the two models converge as a result of the shallower learning 
slope of the Green Book model. Both models produce estimates above the program MS B 
URF estimate. However, they are substantially below the 2009 SAR estimates that triggered 
the Nunn-McCurdy breach. Many elements of F-35 cost growth are not captured in the 
above model estimates. Data from Arnold et al. (2010) allow us to isolate and deconstruct 
the URF portion of the cost growth.13 
                                            
 
 
12 A Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach (10 U.S. Code § 2433a, “Critical cost growth in major defense 
acquisition programs”) occurs when cost growth in program or acquisition unit costs surpasses 15%. 
13 The 2009 F-35 Nunn-McCurdy breach was driven by cost growth in EMD and nonrecurring 
procurement as well as by URF. 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 462 - 
 
 Comparisons of Milestone B and Model Estimates for All F-35 Variants 
Weight growth in all F-35 variants was a driver of cost growth between MS B paper 
designs and the current designs reflecting the aircraft as produced. Almost all weight growth 
attributable to redesign was evident by the 2009 Nunn-McCurdy breach and reflected in the 
production lots.14 As empty weight is an input to the models, the weight growth must be 
taken into account when comparing model outputs to the MS B estimates and subsequent 
cost growth. Another change affecting cost model application is the decrease in 
commonality between variants (F-35A/F-35B/F-35C) since MS B. Current commonality is 
reflected in the “spillover” parameter affecting learning across variants estimated as part of 
the Full Information model. The cost effects of commonality have been estimated by the JSF 
program using a detailed assignment of the learning quantities depending on common 
component applications. As we cannot reproduce such a detailed analysis, we make use of 
the spillover parameter instead—for the MS B estimate we increase its value to reflect 
higher commonality assumed at that point. 
Table 3 shows the MS B URF estimate, a buildup of cost growth drivers to the 2009 
estimate as derived from Arnold et al., and comparisons with the model estimates. Model 
estimates presented include calculations with MS B inputs, and with inputs reflecting 
contemporary values for empty weight and commonality (learning spillovers). 
                                            
 
 
14 We used the latest available weight status to characterize the F-35 variants as procured. These 
values were fixed across the procurement lots and do not include any weight growth margin. 
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 F-35 Program Growth Track From Milestone B to 2009 SAR and Model 
Estimate Comparisons 
 
We orient the model outputs in the table to reflect how they relate to the cost-growth 
elements from the MS B estimates. Elements that represent underestimates based on a 
departure from business as usual (i.e., the historical database) are included above the 
model estimates calculated with the MS B weight and commonality assumptions. The 
estimates reflecting updated weight and commonality are in line with cost growth through 
the Aircraft Weight Growth row. Not accounted for in this application of the IDA model 
estimates are cost increases due to buy profile changes (a reduction in quantities and a 
stretch-out of the procurement schedule) and a misapplication of escalation rates for future 
costs.15 The last cost-growth element is informative of our research question. Instead of 
using contractor-specific labor rate escalation, the JPO used OUSD(C) Green Book inflation 
when converting constant dollar estimates to TY dollar estimates.  
From Arnold et al. (2010): 
However, at the time of Milestone B, the Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) and Lockheed Martin had already agreed to a Forward 
Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) that increased rates more than the OUSD(C) 
escalation indices ... therefore, the fully burdened labor rates turned out to be 
significantly higher than those used in the JPO Milestone B [estimate]. (p. 12) 
The preferred methodology reflected in the 2009 JPO cost estimate is to escalate estimated 
constant year costs to TY dollars using escalation rates appropriate to the different cost 
elements. The OUSD(C) index is then used to de-escalate the TY dollars to BY dollars, 
which are, in turn, reported in the SARs and used as a basis for cost-growth calculations. 
This correction of the original methodology is responsible for the $7 million unit cost growth 
due to escalation rates shown in Table 3. Analogous steps are not reflected in the BY 2002 
model estimates in Table 3; thus, the constant year model estimates presented for 
comparison are conceptually similar to the JPO’s MS B estimates, reflecting the same 
                                            
 
 
15 Both of these effects are addressed in the later benchmark comparisons. 
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error.16 In the next sections, we focus on model-generated TY estimates in the context of 
more up-to-date F-35 estimates. 
F-35 Actual Budget Values 
This section compares model-generated estimates with actual historical costs. The 
emphasis is on the results from the Baseline model. The budget experience is taken from 
Navy and Air Force President’s Budget (PB) Justification Books, “Exhibit P-5, Cost Analysis” 
sheets. In collecting these data, we used the values in the latest PB in which they appeared; 
for example, for the FY 2013 lot, we used data presented in the FY 2015 PB submission. 
For this exercise, we used the unadjusted TY URF values. 
For the Baseline model, we developed the projected hedonic index to generate TY 
estimates through FY 2013. We also included results for the Green Book model, where the 
FY 2002 Green Book index (including extrapolations through FY 2013) is applied. We used 
the hedonic indexes generated by the Full Information and Full Information Less F-35 
models for comparison purposes. For model inputs, we used contemporary values for the 
quality variables and the procurement profiles reflected in the budget data. 
The projected hedonic index is based on the relationship between the FY 2002 
Green Book and Baseline hedonic indexes; it has the advantage of using only information 
through 2002 while taking into account the systematically higher escalation rates associated 
with the hedonic indexes vs. the Green Book rates. 
To calculate the projected hedonic index, we first define the relationship between the 
Green Book index and the hedonic index using data through 2002 as estimated by the 
Baseline model. Given the year-to-year volatility of the hedonic index, we do this by 
comparing 10-year compounded annual growth rates. These data are shown in Figure 3. 
                                            
 
 
16 Although it would be possible to capture the 2009 procurement profile and escalation application 
effects in the modelling exercise, we only address these issues in the context of more up-to-date cost 
data. 
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 Comparison of Baseline Hedonic and Green Book Index Growth Rates, 
1983–2002 
Examination of the data shows that the hedonic and Green Book indexes relate to 
one another most consistently through a multiplicative factor vice an additive adjustment. 
We use the calculated average ratio (mean value) of 1.83, shown in the figure as a 
conversion factor on the 2003–2013 Green Book values, to arrive at the projected hedonic 
index. This is shown along with the other indexes in Figure 4. 
 
 Comparison of Hedonic and Green Book Indexes, 2002–2013 
Figure 5 compares the URF estimates associated with the two models and three 
escalation index assumptions with the budget actuals. 
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 Comparison of Model Estimates With Budget Actuals, All F-35 Variants 
Table 4 compares the estimated URF costs with the budget actuals calculated for the 
2007–2013 budget years, broken out by variants.  
 Comparison of Estimates of 2007–2013 URF Costs, Millions of TY$ 
 
The results show that the Baseline model estimates when projected forward using 
the hedonic index come close to the actual budget values for 2007–2013; estimates 
depending on the Green Book index consistently underestimate the budget URF costs. 
However, the Baseline model tends to miss the costs for the individual variants, with the F-
35B underestimated and the F-35C overestimated. This result is consistent with the 
differences in parameter estimates between the Baseline and Full Information models, 
which are, in turn, a result of the more complex STOVL implementation of the F-35B relative 
to the A/V-8B that is not completely captured in weight differences. 
F-35 2013 SAR/PB 2015 Estimates 
This section takes a somewhat different approach to the F-35 estimating problem. 
The question we want to answer is: what scaling of the FY 2015 Green Book index results in 
the closest fit to the latest JPO estimates? While the previous F-35 estimating exercises 
took the data available in 2002 as given, in this case we assume contemporary data for 
escalation projections. To address this question, we only use the Baseline model with the 
projected hedonic index as presented above. For 2014 onwards, we scale the FY 2015 
Green Book index by a multiplier analogous to the factor used to calculate the projected 
hedonic index. The multiplier is determined by scaling the Green Book index such that the 
model-estimated totals for 2014–2037 are the same as those reported in the SAR. The 
resulting factor is 1.75—comparing directly with the 1.83 factor used to calculate the 
projected hedonic index. This analysis is shown graphically in Figure 6.  
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 Comparison of Model Estimates With the 2013 SAR Estimates, All F-35 
Variants 
If the estimates are projected using the unadjusted Green Book index, the 2014–
2037 URF estimate is $88 million vs. $106 million reported in the SAR. This shows the 
impact of the different indexes on projected costs, isolated from their influence on defining 
the CER model. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper describes different approaches to estimating expected price growth in 
defense system costs. The comparison of cost estimates based on escalation predictions 
derived from hedonic modeling with F-35 budget actuals through FY 2013 is particularly 
interesting. Although the model inputs reflect the latest F-35 aircraft characteristics and 
program parameters, in terms of the structure of the model and escalation projections, the 
models are defined by the information that was available at MS B. As the hedonic index is 
directly estimated only for the historic period, we apply a methodology to project forward 
escalation rates associated with the hedonic index. This example shows the close 
correlation between the Baseline hedonic model estimates and the budget actuals. The 
lower estimates from the Green Book model are due to two factors: the underestimates of 
escalation from FY 2002 to FY 2013 and biases introduced into the model parameters 
because of underestimates of escalation in the historical period. 
Looking out to FY 2037, we find that projecting escalation using our approach closely 
mimics the more detailed buildup of input-specific escalation rates used by the JPO. This is 
in contrast to projections using Green Book escalation, which result in an $18 million 
underestimate in unit costs. 
We demonstrate the effect of different escalation methodologies using top-level CER 
models. Cost analysts usually build up their estimates from a more detailed level. However, 
issues regarding the proper application of price indexes, for both normalizing historical data 
and making projections, are equally valid in more typical cost estimating environments. For 
example, rates of price growth for raw material inputs, propulsion systems, electronic 
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components, and labor inputs are likely to be different from that of general inflation. In our 
last example, we calculated overall escalation rates implied in the JPO estimates for the rest 
of the F-35 program; we found these escalation rates to be consistent with those projected 
using values from the historical hedonic price index. 
The main point is not the superiority of hedonic development of escalation indexes. 
Rather, it is that cost analysts should be attentive to possible differences between inflation 
and escalation and the implications of using inflation as a proxy for escalation when it is not 
a good one. 
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